PERIMETRY RESEARCH

Security barometer of French local authorities

How well do the intercommunalities, départements and regions of France protect their website and e-mail? Passive measurements of every one listed in the official directory of the administration, compared with the communes.

November 2026 edition

1,382
local authorities studied

32.8%
enforce DMARC (quarantine or reject)

15.5%
get an A or a B

Perimetry Cloud
perimetry.cloud · Published 14 November 2026

About this report

Perimetry Research publishes studies of how well public bodies protect their websites and e-mail, measured with the same passive checks as Perimetry Cloud. This edition covers 1,382 intercommunalities, départements, regions and authorities with a special status, and 1,668 domains, with the ten checks of the communes study. It names only the authorities that do well; every other figure is an aggregate, and serious issues are reported privately, never published.

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01

Executive summary

1,382
local authorities studied

60
average score out of 100

32.8%
enforce DMARC (quarantine or reject)

15.5%
get an A or a B

Average score of the 1,372 graded authorities: 60 out of 100.

1. 77.8% of the graded authorities publish a DMARC policy, but only 32.8% enforce it (quarantine or reject). Without an enforced policy, a message forged in an authority's name is generally delivered.
2. Websites: 98.7% have a valid certificate and 90.9% send visitors from HTTP to HTTPS; 38.8% use HSTS for six months or more.
3. 25.9% of their domains are signed with DNSSEC, and 2.6% publish a CAA record naming the authorities allowed to issue their certificates.
4. The intercommunalities average 60 out of 100, the communes 47.
5. 1.2% of the town halls write from, or publish on, their intercommunality's own domain: when it is well protected, so are they.

02

Key findings

Where the authorities are on the internet

Website



own domain 98.8% shared with another authority 0% a town's domain 0.7% website platform 0%
social network page 0% none listed 0.5%

E-mail address



own domain 89.7% shared with another authority 0% a town's domain 1.4%
consumer mailbox 1.6% none listed 7.3%

DMARC: published, rarely enforced

77.8% of the graded authorities publish a DMARC policy, but only 32.8% enforce it (quarantine or reject). Without an enforced policy, a message forged in an authority's name is generally delivered.

Websites

Websites: 98.7% have a valid certificate and 90.9% send visitors from HTTP to HTTPS; 38.8% use HSTS for six months or more.

DNS: signatures and certificate authorities

25.9% of their domains are signed with DNSSEC, and 2.6% publish a CAA record naming the authorities allowed to issue their certificates.

Compared with the communes

The intercommunalities average 60 out of 100, the communes 47.


Shared domains

1.2% of the town halls write from, or publish on, their intercommunality's own domain: when it is well protected, so are they.

03

Grades

Each authority with a domain of its own gets a score: the share of the ten checks that it passes, among those that apply to it (the communes study's score). Grades: A from 90, B from 75, C from 60, D from 40, E from 20, F below.




04


Check by check

Share of the graded authorities that pass each check, among those it applies to.


Website



DNS



E-mail



The ten checks	
Website · Valid HTTPS certificate	The site answers over HTTPS with a certificate that is in date, issued for its name, and trusted by browsers.
Website · HTTP sends visitors to HTTPS	Someone who types the address lands on the encrypted site, not on a page anyone on the network can read or alter.
Website · HSTS for six months or more	Browsers remember to use HTTPS only, so the first unencrypted request cannot be hijacked.
Website · Basic protective headers	X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff, and protection against being framed by another site (X-Frame-Options or CSP frame-ancestors).
DNS · DNSSEC	Answers about the domain are signed, so a resolver cannot be fed false addresses for the authority's site or mail.
DNS · CAA record	The domain names the certificate authorities allowed to issue certificates for it.

The ten checks	
E-mail · Strict SPF	The domain lists the servers allowed to send its mail and asks receivers to reject or flag the others (-all or ~all).
E-mail · DMARC record	The domain publishes a DMARC policy, the standard that ties SPF and DKIM to the visible sender.
E-mail · DMARC enforced	The policy is quarantine or reject: messages forged in the authority's name go to spam or are refused, not delivered.
E-mail · Address on a public domain	The address in the directory is on the authority's own domain or a shared public one, not on a consumer mailbox (Orange, Gmail…) it does not control.

05

By category


Categories with fewer than ten graded authorities show no figures, so that none of them can be singled out. The median is the score half of the graded authorities reach.

Category	Authorities	Graded	Average	A or B	Own site	DMARC enforced	Median
Metropolises (métropoles)	21	21	68	33.3%	100%	38.1%	–
Urban communities	14	14	58	7.1%	100%	28.6%	–
Agglomeration communities	229	226	64	23.9%	98.3%	42.9%	60
Communities of communes	988	983	59	11.9%	99%	29.1%	60
Territorial public establishments (Greater Paris)	11	9	·	·	·	·	·
Départements	93	93	63	24.7%	100%	44.1%	60
Regions	14	14	71	50%	100%	57.1%	–
Authorities with a special status	7	7	·	·	·	·	·
Overseas collectivities	5	5	·	·	·	·	·

Average



DMARC enforced




06


Compared with the communes

The same ten checks as the study of the French communes (edition of November 2026): share of the graded bodies that pass each one.

	Communes	Intercommunalities	Départements	Regions
Average score	47	60	63	71
Valid HTTPS certificate	93.4%	98.7%	98.9%	100%
HTTP sends visitors to HTTPS	86.4%	90.9%	90.8%	85.7%
HSTS for six months or more	28.3%	37.9%	43.7%	71.4%
Basic protective headers	26.1%	38.6%	58.6%	78.6%
DNSSEC	22.1%	26.8%	18.3%	14.3%
CAA record	2.8%	1.8%	7.5%	35.7%
Strict SPF	85.9%	97.1%	98.9%	92.9%
DMARC record	45.2%	76.4%	92.5%	100%
DMARC enforced	19.2%	31.7%	44.1%	57.1%
Address on a public domain	71.1%	98.3%	100%	100%

Intercommunalities / Communes




Strict SPF
Intercommunalities
97.1%
Communes
85.9%
DMARC record
Intercommunalities
76.4%
Communes
45.2%
DMARC enforced
Intercommunalities
31.7%
Communes
19.2%
Address on a public domain
Intercommunalities
98.3%
Communes
71.1%

07

Intercommunalities by population

The four categories of intercommunality together, by number of inhabitants.


Population	Authorities	Graded	Average	A or B	Own site	DMARC enforced	Median
200,000 inhabitants or more	49	49	67	34.7%	100%	46.9%	67
50,000 to 199,999	234	231	64	21.6%	98.3%	40.6%	60
20,000 to 49,999	443	441	61	15.4%	98.9%	35.4%	60
Under 20,000	526	523	56	8.4%	99%	23.2%	60

08

Shared domains

Many intercommunalities run the website or the e-mail of their member communes on their own domain. 1.2% of the town halls listed in the directory write from, or publish on, their intercommunality's domain, and 10.9% of the intercommunalities with a domain serve at least one member town hall that way. Their protection is shared too: an intercommunality that enforces DMARC protects the addresses of its communes with it.

10 intercommunalities have no site of their own: their website is a page of a member town's site. They are counted, not graded.



09

The authorities that get it right

2 local authorities pass every one of the ten checks.

Authority	Category
Caux Seine Agglo	Agglomerations
Conseil départemental – Orne	Départements

Best in each category

The highest scores among authorities with their own website (at least nine checks applying, 75 or more), in the categories of thirty graded authorities or more only (in a smaller one, only the honour roll is named).

Agglomeration communities

Authority	Score
Caux Seine Agglo	100
Communauté d'agglomération Saint Germain Boucles de Seine	90
Communauté Paris-Saclay	90
Douaisis Agglo	90
Communauté d'agglomération Maubeuge Val de Sambre	90
Lannion-Trégor Communauté	90
Communauté d'agglomération du Grand Chambéry	89
Communauté d'agglomération du Pays Basque	80
Communauté d'agglomération Val Parisis	80
Communauté d'agglomération de Béthune-Bruay, Artois-Lys Romane	80

Communities of communes

Authority	Score
Communauté de communes Auray Quiberon Terre Atlantique	90
Intercom Bernay Terres de Normandie	90
Ploërmel Communauté	90
Communauté de communes du Pays des Abers	90
Communauté de communes du Ternois	90
Communauté de communes du Grand Autunois Morvan	90
Communauté de communes des Grands Lacs	90
Bretagne Porte de Loire Communauté	90
Communauté de communes du Volvestre	90
Communauté de communes du Pays Haut Val d'Alzette	90

Départements

Authority	Score
Conseil départemental – Orne	100
Conseil départemental – Charente-Maritime	90
Conseil départemental – Nord	89
Conseil départemental – Manche	89
Conseil départemental – Gironde	80
Conseil départemental – Hauts-de-Seine	80
Conseil départemental – Yvelines	80
Conseil départemental – Haute-Garonne	80
Conseil départemental – Pas-de-Calais	80
Conseil départemental – Finistère	80

10

Intercommunalities by region


Aggregates only. Regions with fewer than ten graded intercommunalities (5) show no figures.

Region	Authorities	Graded	Average	A or B	Own site	DMARC enforced
Guadeloupe	6	6	·	·	·	·
Martinique	3	3	·	·	·	·
Guyane	4	4	·	·	·	·
La Réunion	5	5	·	·	·	·
Mayotte	5	4	·	·	·	·
Île-de-France	52	52	65	28.8%	100%	44.2%
Centre-Val de Loire	81	80	57	6.3%	98.8%	21.3%
Bourgogne-Franche-Comté	114	114	56	6.1%	100%	23.7%
Normandie	69	67	64	22.4%	95.7%	35.8%
Hauts-de-France	90	90	60	18.9%	98.9%	27%
Grand Est	148	148	56	6.8%	98.6%	28.4%
Pays de la Loire	69	69	64	20.3%	98.6%	26.1%
Bretagne	59	58	69	34.5%	98.3%	47.4%
Nouvelle-Aquitaine	156	156	58	9%	100%	30.8%
Occitanie	159	157	60	15.9%	98.7%	39.7%
Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes	167	166	61	14.5%	99.4%	32.5%
Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur	46	46	60	17.4%	100%	41.3%
Corse	19	19	48	0%	100%	15.8%


11

Behind the numbers


Who issues the certificates of their own sites



What their own sites run on



Registrars of their domains




Consumer mailboxes in the directory



12

Serious issues

7 local authorities have a serious issue that could be used against them right away. They are not named in this report or anywhere else: the authorities concerned are told first, quietly.



13

Recommendations

1 Enforce DMARC

Most authorities publish a DMARC policy and stop there. Read the reports for a few weeks, then move to quarantine and reject: that is what stops messages forged in your name, and in your communes' names when they write from your domain.

2 Redirect to HTTPS and turn on HSTS

Every visit should land on the encrypted site; HSTS makes browsers remember it. Most hosts offer both in a single setting.

3 Sign your domains with DNSSEC and add a CAA record

Most French registrars offer DNSSEC with one click. A CAA record lists the authorities allowed to issue your certificates.

4 Look after the domains you share

When your communes use your domain, its protection is theirs. Keep their addresses and sites on it under the same policy, and tell them when it changes.

5 Keep the official directory up to date

The address and website listed on Service-Public.fr are what residents and other administrations use. A domain listed there and left to expire can be registered by anyone.

6 Watch it over time

Certificates expire, providers change, records get lost in a migration. A regular check catches it before residents do.

14

Methodology

Passive checks only

We read what any visitor or mail server can see: public DNS records, the domain registration (RDAP), the TLS certificate, one request for the home page over HTTP (its redirect is read, not followed), and the home page over HTTPS (following its redirects, as a browser would). Nothing else on the site is requested. When a domain publishes an MTA-STS policy, its policy file is read too, as mail servers do.

No port scanning, no subdomain discovery, no login attempts, no forms, no testing for vulnerabilities. The robot is slow on purpose and spreads its requests over several hours.

The robot

It identifies itself as PerimetryResearch/1.0 (+https://perimetry.cloud/research/methodology/). If you run a site it visited and would rather it did not, write to hello@perimetry.cloud and we will leave the domain out of the next editions.

The study of intercommunalities, départements and regions

Population: every intercommunality with its own tax powers in the official list of the State's geographic API (geo.api.gouv.fr, Licence Ouverte 2.0), matched on its SIREN number with its record in the official directory of the administration (Service-Public.fr, DILA, Licence Ouverte 2.0), the same file as the communes study; every departmental and regional council in that directory; the authorities with a special status it lists (Collectivité de Corse, Martinique, Guyane, Mayotte, the Ville de Paris, the Collectivité européenne d'Alsace, the Métropole de Lyon) and the overseas collectivities it lists (Wallis-et-Futuna is not among them). Directory records of other bodies (syndicates, for example) are left out and counted.

Two more sources, from BANATIC, the national base of intercommunalities (DGCL, data.gouv.fr, Licence Ouverte 2.0): the eleven établissements publics territoriaux of the Grand Paris, a category of their own (their website is the directory's when it lists them, otherwise their official website in Wikidata, CC0); and the intercommunalities created on 1 January by a merger, which the geographic API does not list yet: they are studied as the directory lists them, with BANATIC's name, category, population and number of communes, and marked as recent mergers; the former intercommunalities they replace are left out.

Categories: metropolises, urban communities, agglomeration communities and communities of communes (from their official names), territorial public establishments, départements, regions, authorities with a special status and overseas collectivities. The population and the number of communes come from the geographic API (the Rhône without the Métropole de Lyon), or from BANATIC for the bodies it alone lists.

The website and the e-mail address are the ones the directory gives. The rules are the communes study's: a domain two bodies of the study use is shared and not graded; a site on a website platform is graded as the platform's; a page of a State site does not count. An intercommunality whose website is a page on a member town's site, or whose address is on a domain a town outside it writes from, is not graded on that

town's domain; one whose site sits at the root of a domain it shares with a town (the city and its metropolis, for example) is graded on it, as that domain serves both.

The same ten checks, the same score and the same grades as the communes study, so the two compare. When the home page could not be read over HTTPS (a timeout, a connection cut, often a site refusing robots), HSTS and the protective headers are unknown and left out of the score; a redirect loop still fails them, as visitors cannot reach the site either. A body whose home page could not be read is never named.

Small groups: a category, a population band or a region shows no figures below ten graded bodies, and the groups without figures taken together must count ten graded bodies or more (otherwise the smallest groups shown are hidden too, or, for the categories, the hidden ones are left out of the totals), so that no figure can be worked out by subtraction. Below thirty graded bodies, a category names its honour roll only, never its best performers, and publishes no score histogram and no quartiles: with fourteen regions, naming seven and showing how the scores spread would tell that the others are below the line.

For each category and population band of thirty graded bodies or more, the edition also publishes how the scores spread (how many bodies score in each five-point band, a band of fewer than three being merged with its neighbour, and the quartiles): enough for a body to see where it stands among its peers, without naming any of them.

Mutualisation: the share of the town halls (read in the same directory) whose website or e-mail is on their intercommunality's own domain.

Good performers only

We name the communes that do well (the honour roll and the best of each size band), never the ones that do badly, and never a commune with a serious issue, whatever its score. Everything else is published as aggregates: by size of commune and by département, where a département with fewer than ten graded communes shows no figures, so that none of them can be singled out.

Website platforms are graded on a sample of up to five communes' sites there: a check counts as passed when most of the sample passes it.

Serious issues are reported privately

Some findings could be used against a commune right away: a domain listed in the official directory that no longer exists (anyone could register it), a registration the registry is deleting, an expired certificate, an SPF record that lets anyone send mail in its name. These are never published. We tell the commune first, quietly, and count them in the study without naming anyone.

Limits

Each edition is a snapshot taken over a few hours. The directory can be out of date or wrong; we use it as published. DKIM keys are looked for on common selectors only, so they are not graded. A site behind a protection service may answer differently to a robot than to a visitor. Mail servers are not tested (STARTTLS needs port 25, which the study's infrastructure cannot reach).

Reuse

The figures of each edition can be downloaded as JSON from the study page. You may reuse them with a link to the study. The underlying directory remains under the Licence Ouverte 2.0 (source: Service-Public.fr, DILA).

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About Perimetry

Perimetry is an open source tool that audits the outside of a domain the way anyone on the internet sees it: e-mail authentication, DNS, certificates, mail servers, websites. Perimetry Cloud is its hosted version, with continuous monitoring, alerts and reports, for organisations and the agencies that look after them.

Cite as: Perimetry Research, Security barometer of French local authorities, November 2026. https://perimetry.cloud/research/french-local-authorities/

You may reuse the figures of this report with a link to the study. The underlying directory and the geographic API remain under the Licence Ouverte 2.0 (sources: Service-Public.fr, DILA; geo.api.gouv.fr).

Next edition: February 2027, then every quarter.

Contact: hello@perimetry.cloud

`https://perimetry.cloud/research/french-local-authorities/`